“This precedent-setting victory for Ms. Beavers and her family sends a clear warning to anyone who would abuse the judicial process in an attempt to censor honest, critical consumer reviews and other constitutionally protected speech,” said Horwitz Law, PLLC attorney Daniel Horwitz, a First Amendment, anti-SLAPP, and speech defense lawyer who represented Ms. Beavers along with Sarah Martin. “The First Amendment protects every person’s right to speak freely, and this ruling makes clear that the consequences for plaintiffs who file baseless defamation suits in Tennessee will be severe.”
After Dr. Nandigam dismissed and then refiled his lawsuit against her, Ms. Beavers filed a Petition to Dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims under the Tennessee Public Participation Act. Ms. Beavers’ petition was granted, and the Tennessee Court of Appeals has now affirmed that dismissal in its entirety while ordering the Plaintiffs to pay Ms. Beavers’ legal fees and potential sanctions. “As [Ms. Beavers] aptly notes in her principal brief, ‘the TPPA . . . was designed to prevent and deter such abuse, not to enable it,'” the Court of Appeals ruled. Ms. Beavers’ claims for attorney’s fees and sanctions against Dr. Nandigam remain pending and will be adjudicated upon remand. The Court of Appeals’ opinion additionally orders that: “We remand this matter to the general sessions court for a determination of the proper amount of reasonable fees incurred by Defendant during this appeal” as well.
On June 4, 2021, Horwitz Law, PLLC filed an amici curiae brief on behalf of the Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce and the election advocacy group Tennesseans for Sensible Election Laws in Metropolitan Government, et al. v. Davidson County Election Commission, et al., Davidson County Chancery Court Case No. 21-0433-IV. Chancellor Russell T. Perkins entered an order accepting the brief on June 7, 2021.
The organizations’ brief asserts that the Davidson County Election Commission acted unlawfully by approving a multi-date referendum petition despite the Metro Charter’s unambiguous requirement that petitioners “prescribe a date” for an election in order to afford appropriate notice to voters. The brief also contends that the Election Commission acted unlawfully and exceeded its jurisdiction by setting the referendum election at issue for an entirely separate third date. Significantly, until now, the Election Commission has long maintained that the Metro Charter’s “prescribe a date” requirement forbids the Election Commission from altering the election date selected by petitioners, making its actions a significant departure from its own longstanding, established practice.
“Both organizations are concerned with the Davidson County Election Commission’s seemingly partisan-motivated, selective interpretations and abrupt change in position regarding long-established rules,” said attorney Daniel A. Horwitz—who filed the brief along with Horwitz Law, PLLC attorney Lindsay Smith—in a statement to the Tennessean. “The Election Commission’s position also ensures a constant stream of expedited, pre-election litigation, and it creates serious concerns that going forward, partisanship will dictate outcomes regarding what is supposed to be the neutral process of election administration.”
In 2019, Tennessee’s free speech law underwent a sea change. The Tennessee Public Participation Act—Tennessee’s first-ever meaningful anti-SLAPP law—took effect, ushering in a host of protections for people sued for defamation (libel or slander), false light invasion of privacy, business disparagement, or other speech-based torts. Due to a recent decision out of Hamilton County, the constitutionality of the TPPA has now been expressly affirmed. After nearly two years, it is also clear that the TPPA is working as intended “to encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to speak freely, to associate freely, and to participate in government to the fullest extent permitted by law. . .” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-102.
Bedsole v. Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. is a defamation lawsuit concerning the TV show “Tiny House Nation.” After being sued, the defendants in that case raised claims for dismissal under the TPPA. In response, the plaintiff asserted that the TPPA was unconstitutional in its entirety based on the Tennessee Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine. Thus, in late February 2021, the Hamilton County Circuit Court held a hearing on the contested constitutionality of the statute.
There are, of course, several immediate problems with any broad claim that the Tennessee Public Participation Act is “unconstitutional.” To begin, the TPPA is a collection of statutory provisions, not a single statute. It has many different features—an automatic stay on discovery provision, fee-shifting and discretionary sanctions provisions, an interlocutory appeal provision, and several other provisions—all of which function independently. Several of those provisions also are not even theoretically unconstitutional, and there is no serious argument otherwise. More generally, anti-SLAPP statutes like the TPPA—which is narrowly tailored to preserve judicial discretion—also promote compelling public interests and serve as an essential tool to protect the oft-ignored rights of third parties.
Upon review, the Hamilton County Circuit Court issued a short but forceful ruling affirming the TPPA’s constitutionality. “The TPPA, at least in the eyes of this Court, is clearly predicated upon public policy concerns,” the Court explained. “There can be no serious questions that the intent of the legislature in passing this statute was to effect a more beneficial public policy.” Further, “the over-arching purpose of the statute”—“to provide protection to [Tennessee’s] citizens from SLAPP lawsuits”—“do[es] not mandate any particular result but leave[s] the ultimate decision within the discretion of the trial court.” Indeed, the Court noted, “the statute actually broadens the court’s authority to move past the very low requirements of Rules 8 and 12, and to impose attorney’s fees following a burden shift not previously available to the litigants.” Thus, the Court held, “the constitutional challenge of the Plaintiff is DENIED.”
To be sure, this ruling is excellent news for anyone who cares about free speech in Tennessee. Before the TPPA was enacted,bad actors could credibly threaten to impose tens—if not hundreds—of thousands of dollars’ worth of litigation expenses in SLAPP-suits over a period of several years if their baseless retraction or other demands were not met in legally frivolous speech-based tort cases. That is no longer true, given the very real possibility that a plaintiff who files a SLAPP-suit will be ordered to pay the other side’s legal fees and could potentially be sanctioned. The end result is that negotiating power has flipped, outcomes have dramatically improved, and any number of SLAPP-suits have been avoided entirely because plaintiffs were not willing to risk the severe consequences associated with filing one. Speech defense attorneys (like the author) are also able to defend against SLAPP-suits on a contingent basis now, rather than having to do so on a pro bono basis when a defendant cannot afford to pay for a vigorous defense.
The evidence that the TPPA is working as intended is also indisputable at this juncture. To date, TPPA petitions have been granted in four total cases:
This lawsuit against a woman who posted a negative Yelp! review about a business (fees and sanctions pending appeal);
This lawsuit against a woman who called 911 and sought an order of protection ($26,500.00 fees and sanctions award);
This lawsuit against three community activists who criticized a congressional candidate ($39,000.00 fees and sanctions award); and
This lawsuit regarding charges of animal cruelty (fees and sanctions TBD).
Why, specifically, is the TPPA so effective? The answer is “for several reasons,” but the following three changes are instructive:
1. Prior to the TPPA being enacted, no matter how much money a plaintiff forced a defendant to spend on legal fees in order to defend against a bogus SLAPP-suit, a prevailing defendant’s ability to recover his or her legal expenses after securing a dismissal and then upholding the dismissal through appeal was capped at $10,000.00. That is no longer the case, because under the TPPA, defendants who are subjected to baseless SLAPP-suits can recover their full legal fees and be made whole after winning. That difference has also had enormous practical consequences when it comes to negotiating power and settlement leverage, and it enables rapid dismissals by agreement in cases that might otherwise have lasted years.
2. Prior to the TPPA being enacted, plaintiffs could impose massive litigation costs and expenses and subject defendants to intrusive discovery simply by making baseless allegations that they did not have to substantiate with evidence until much later in a case. That is no longer true, either, because the TPPA allows defendants who are subjected to speech-based lawsuits to force plaintiffs to come forward with admissible evidence to substantiate their claims immediately. If a plaintiff cannot or does not do so, the plaintiff’s lawsuit will be dismissed with prejudice, and the plaintiff will be ordered to pay the defendant’s full legal fees.
3. Trial court judges make mistakes from time to time, and prior to the TPPA being enacted, an erroneous trial court ruling that a cognizable claim for defamation had been alleged could take years to correct—forcing defendants to go through intrusive and costly discovery or even a full-blown trial in the interim. As a consequence, an incorrect trial court ruling frequently had the effect of coercing defendants to settle baseless SLAPP-suits just to avoid the cost and stress of litigation. Now, however, defendants who are subjected to frivolous speech-based lawsuits have a right to take an immediate interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals and avoid such expenses by getting damaging trial court errors corrected early.
Even with the TPPA in place, of course, competently defending against defamation and other speech-based lawsuits remains a complex and expensive proposition that requires specialized expertise. Definitionally, the type of people who file SLAPP-suits—and the lawyers who take their cases—are also willing to abuse the legal process in order to censor, intimidate, and retaliate against critics, which means that such cases invariably involve unethical and abusive people as a matter of course. There are also a disturbingly large number of ways that the legal system can be abused successfully by bad actors and unethical people generally, so it remains important to have a competent speech defense lawyer who can effectively push back.
The good news, though, is that with the TPPA in place, litigants’ ability to impose legal consequences now goes in both directions. Plaintiffs who file SLAPP-suits can now be forced to pay very large sums of money to the people they have baselessly sued as well. As detailed above, that has happened already, and while certain gaps in speech-based protections remain, it will continue to happen as long as the TPPA remains in effect. This is good news for everyone who cares about the right to speak freely, as well as the right to hear what others have to say.
Historically, many have explained away Tennessee’s legislative spigot of unconstitutionality as just another manifestation of the General Assembly’s gleeful stupidity. By coming after Davidson County Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle, however—a veteran judge appointed by a Republican Governor, and one of Tennessee’s most widely respected jurists—the General Assembly has made clear that its routine incompetence is also paired with a large helping of malice toward constitutional constraints in general. Disturbingly, though, while other legislative malpractice is typically remediable through judicial review, the Tennessee House GOP’s latest foray into lawless action is a direct assault on the separation of powers that threatens the independence of Tennessee’s judiciary itself.
The relevant background is as follows: In the summer of 2020, as Tennessee was being ravaged by a deadly pandemic that spread through in-person contact, several voters filed lawsuits in Davidson County Chancery Court seeking to expand absentee ballot access. The combined lawsuits involved the following two distinct categories of plaintiffs who sued for the right to cast an absentee ballot during the COVID-19 pandemic:
(1) “persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19 and persons who are caretakers for persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19;” and
(2) “persons who neither have special vulnerability to COVID-19 nor are caretakers for persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19,” but who were nonetheless worried about the consequences of becoming infected with COVID-19 or spreading COVID-19 to others.
At the time the cases were pending before Chancellor Lyle, the State of Tennessee took the position that neither category of voters qualified to cast an absentee ballot under applicable Tennessee law. Thus, the State defendants contended that both categories of voters would have to vote in person, or else, they would have to forgo their right to vote at all.
Upon review of the evidence before her, Chancellor Lyle ruled that “the State’s restrictive interpretation and application of Tennessee’s voting by mail law (Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-6-201), during the unique circumstances of the pandemic, constitutes an unreasonable burden on the fundamental right to vote guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution.” As a consequence, Chancellor Lyle ordered the State of Tennessee to permit both categories of voters to vote by absentee ballot during the 2020 elections. Of some note, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia already allowed any voter to vote by absentee ballot during non-pandemic times, and virtually every jurisdiction other than Tennessee had taken significant additional steps to accommodate pandemic circumstances. Tennessee has also long permitted no-excuse absentee ballot voting for certain favored categories of voters, such as voters who are “sixty years of age or older.” Those responsible for selectively slicing and dicing absentee ballot access in this way can presumably explain why.
Unhappy with being ordered to expand absentee ballot eligibility to vulnerable voters, their caretakers, and others during a pandemic, the governmental defendants in the case did two things after Chancellor Lyle ruled against them. First, they asked the Tennessee Supreme Court to take up and review Chancellor Lyle’s order immediately. Second, they violated her order in material respects, prompting Chancellor Lyle to state—apparently unforgivably—“shame on you.”
While the State’s appeal was pending before the Tennessee Supreme Court, the State defendants—through the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office—abruptly reversed course as to whether the first category of voters listed above was qualified to vote by absentee ballot under existing law. Specifically, during oral argument before the Tennessee Supreme Court, the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office adopted the irreconcilable and novel position that “persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19 and persons who are caretakers for persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19” already qualified to vote by absentee ballot under the following two provisions of Tennessee law:
(C) The person is hospitalized, ill or physically disabled, and because of such condition, the person is unable to appear at the person’s polling place on election day; or
(D) The person is a caretaker of a hospitalized, ill or disabled person[.]
Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D) (2014 & Supp. 2019).
Two aspects of this concession are worthy of emphasis. The first is that it is not the position that the State of Tennessee took while the case was before Chancellor Lyle. The second is that it is not actually what the law says. Simply put: Fear of becoming “hospitalized, ill or physically disabled” is not the same thing as being “hospitalized, ill or physically disabled.” Because forcing vulnerable people to take on a genuine risk of death in order to vote would be an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote, though—precisely what Chancellor Lyle had ruled—the State defendants and the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office opted to change state law unilaterally in order to avoid an adverse constitutional ruling. Of note, months later, Tennessee Attorney General Herbert Slatery—who is not famous for honesty—would go on to ask the U.S. Supreme Court to void the entire U.S. Presidential election on the basis that certain other states had done the same thing.
Upon review, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued a partially unanimous and partially split opinion. To begin, given the State’s above “concession” during oral argument regarding the first category of medically vulnerable voters and their caretakers, the Tennessee Supreme Court unanimously agreed that such voters could vote by absentee ballot. In particular, the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion stated:
At oral argument before this Court, the State conceded that, under its interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-6-201(5)(C) and (D), persons who have underlying medical or health conditions which render them more susceptible to contracting COVID-19 or at greater risk should they contract it (“persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19”), as well as those who are caretakers for persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19, already are eligible to vote absentee by mail. We hold that injunctive relief is not necessary with respect to such plaintiffs and persons. We instruct the State to ensure that appropriate guidance, consistent with the State’s acknowledged interpretation, is provided to Tennessee registered voters with respect to the eligibility of such persons to vote absentee by mail in advance of the November 2020 election.
Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that Chancellor Lyle’s injunction compelling that result was no longer necessary given the State’s modified position, which fully conceded the issue.
Next, the Tennessee Supreme Court issued a 4-1 ruling that the second category of voters—those who did not have special vulnerabilities to COVID-19—could not vote absentee, because four Justices determined that the burden that COVID-19 imposed on healthy voters’ right to vote was not unreasonable. Accordingly, a majority of the Court reversed Chancellor Lyle’s ruling with respect to “persons who neither have special vulnerability to COVID-19 nor are caretakers for persons with special vulnerability to COVID-19” alone.
Now seven months later, dozens of Republican members of Tennessee’s House of Representatives not only remain upset with Chancellor Lyle’s order—they seek to remove her from her office because of it. The reason? An allegation of judicial overreach. Specifically, State Rep. Tim Rudd—the Resolution’s main sponsor—contends:
“The U.S. Constitution plainly states ‘The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations’ (Article I, section 4),’ Rudd said. “The last time I looked, the words, ‘Judiciary having the power to hold elections’ was [sic] not in the U.S. Constitution or the Tennessee State Constitution.”
Again, two matters are worthy of emphasis. The first is that Representative Rudd appears to be unfamiliar with what actually occurred during the litigation before Chancellor Lyle, because the scope of Article I, section 4—an issue that the United States Supreme Court recently declined to review—was not even presented in the case. Readers will search the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion in vain for any reference to it. The reason? Chancellor Lyle’s order was a ruling that a Tennessee election law abridged a constitutional right as applied to pandemic circumstances—a ruling that is not even theoretically in conflict with Article I, section 4. By contrast, what the Tennessee Attorney General and the State defendants in the case did—abruptly change the meaning of state election law during the middle of litigation without any legislative approval or supporting statutory basis for doing so—may well have contravened Article I, section 4. Consequently, if that is Representative Rudd’s concern, then he is attempting to remove the wrong public officials from office.
The second matter is that seeking to remove a judge from office because the judge ruled that a state statute is unconstitutional is, itself, unconstitutional. If removal were permitted under these circumstances, the result “would be monstrous and wholly abhorrent to fundamental ideas of justice and judicial independence,” and “the judiciary would no longer be an independent and co-ordinate branch of the government, but a mere servile dependency.” That is not the author’s characterization. It is what the Supreme Court of Tennessee ruled regarding the Tennessee Constitution’s removal provision in 1899, when it clearly and unmistakably held that the General Assembly would be forbidden from removing a judge on the basis that the judge “had declared unconstitutional a particular enactment of the legislature.” See McCulley v. State (State Report Title: The Judges’ Cases), 102 Tenn. 509, 53 S.W. 134, 138 (1899).
Instead, judges may only be removed for valid legal cause, such as misconduct in office. See, e.g., In re Dender, 571 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tenn. 1978) (“Article VI, Sec. 6[ ] provides sanctions to be applied against a judge guilty of official misconduct.”); Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 93-21 (Mar. 12, 1993) (“Removal under Article VI, Section 6 must be for cause, affecting the judge personally or the administration of his office. This requirement prohibits the possibility of arbitrary removals.”) (citation omitted). In 1987, the Tennessee Supreme Court also expressly reaffirmed that “the removal contemplated by Article VI, section 6 [must be] for cause affecting the official personally or the administration of his office, to be effected after notice and trial.”In re Murphy, 726 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tenn. 1987). And while other (Republican) judges’ actual misconduct in office has curiously been ignored by the General Assembly, at least where Chancellor Lyle is concerned, no such misconduct has even plausibly been alleged.
Put another way: The claim that Chancellor Lyle violated any law at all is not a serious one. She adjudicated a legal dispute that was brought to her, which is what judges do. On appeal, the State of Tennessee outright conceded part of what she ruled, and the Tennessee Supreme Court issued a split opinion reversing her ruling on another aspect of the case. Unsurprisingly, given the importance of an independent judiciary, removal under these circumstances is not only improper—it is illegal.
Neither is Representative Rudd’s apparent upset about Chancellor Lyle tsk-tsking the State defendants for violating her order a removable offense. Up until the moment of reversal, Chancellor Lyle’s orders were indisputably valid, and the parties in the case were obligated to follow them. As the Tennessee Supreme Court has made clear many times: “An order is not rendered void or unlawful simply because it is erroneous or subject to reversal on appeal. Erroneous orders must be followed until they are reversed.” Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Authority, 249 S.W.3d 346, 355 (Tenn. 2008) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the State defendants did not comply with her orders. The legal term for this is “contempt.” For reasons that are frankly inexplicable, the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office and governmental defendants also routinely violate or otherwise fail to comply with court orders. Thus, if anything, consequences far more severe than the words “shame on you” were warranted.
In summary: Representative Rudd and his clown car are not only, yet again, attempting something that is constitutionally forbidden—they are threatening the independence of Tennessee’s judiciary in the process. This threat is intolerable and unacceptable. Their lawless behavior should be condemned by anyone who cares about judicial independence, the Constitution, or the most basic tenets of the rule of law as a consequence.
Few would disagree that the government shouldn’t be permitted to act illegally. In a frighteningly large number of instances, though—due to outmoded doctrines like sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and absolute immunity for certain government officials—the government can act illegally without experiencing legal consequences for doing so. The result of that legal construct is that government officials are often free to violate state statutes or provisions of the Tennessee Constitution and the U.S. Constitution without risk, leaving those who are victimized by governmental misconduct unable to do anything about it.
Happily, in 2018, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a little-noticed law that has had profound practical effects. Codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121, it provides that:
“Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a cause of action shall exist under this chapter for any affected person who seeks declaratory or injunctive relief in any action brought regarding the legality or constitutionality of a governmental action. A cause of action shall not exist under this chapter to seek damages.”
As a result of Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121, it is now possible for victims of governmental misconduct in Tennessee to obtain certain forms of relief—specifically, declaratory judgments and injunctions—regarding illegal or unconstitutional governmental actions. And obtain relief under Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121 they have. As a few examples:
1. Tennessee’s Bureau of Ethics and Campaign Finance, Registry of Election Finance has been permanently enjoined from enforcing an unconstitutional law that allowed partisan political action committees to participate in the political process just before an election, while prohibiting non-partisan political action committees from doing the same.
2. Metro Nashville and its ex-Director of Schools have been permanently enjoined from enforcing a contractual gag order against dissenting School Board Members that prevented them from criticizing the ex-Director of Schools—a provision that was also declared illegal as a violation of the First Amendment and multiple state provisions.
3. A criminal law that exclusively prohibited “false” statements about political candidates—including satire and parody—in campaign literature has been declared unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
4. The Tennessee Board of Cosmetology and Barber Examiners has been permanently enjoined from enforcing a law that prevented a man from working as a barber solely because he did not have a high school diploma. And:
5. The State of Tennessee has been permanently enjoined from implementing a selectively-targeted school voucher law in violation of the Home Rule provision of the Tennessee Constitution.
These examples are not exhaustive. For example, a lawsuit is presently pending under Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121 to enjoin notorious private prison operator CoreCivic from systematically refusing to maintain a constitutionally adequate level of inmate safety and systematically failing to provide inmates constitutionally adequate health care at its scandal-prone Trousdale Turner Correctional Center. Additionally, even failed lawsuits—like a lawsuit filed by the Tennessee Democratic Party and U.S. Senate candidate Marquita Bradshaw regarding public records access—have been adjudicated on their merits due to Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121, rather than being dismissed upfront based on the premise that the government cannot be sued at all.
All of this is great news if you believe that the government should be held accountable for breaking the law. To be sure, though, enacting Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121 should not actually have been necessary. At least since the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision in Colonial Pipeline Company v. Morgan—a 2008 opinion addressing litigants’ right to sue the government for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding constitutional violations—it has been clear that “sovereign immunity simply does not apply to a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a statute against state officers.” That decision, however, did not stop Tennessee’s flagrantly dishonest and democracy-hating Attorney General from arguing that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decision should be ignored and that such claims should be disallowed anyway.[1] Thus, the General Assembly felt compelled to make clear, beyond any serious dispute, through Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121 that: “Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a cause of action shall exist under this chapter for any affected person who seeks declaratory or injunctive relief in any action brought regarding the legality or constitutionality of a governmental action.” Remarkably, the Attorney General’s Office continues to argue that such lawsuits still should not be allowed regardless of what Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121 unambiguously says on the matter. Unsurprisingly, those arguments have not proven successful.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121 also falls short in a critical respect. In particular, it makes clear that “[a] cause of action shall not exist under this chapter to seek damages.” Consequently, because damages generally are not allowed in Tennessee for state constitutional or statutory violations under any other provision, either, many individuals who are deprived of their rights or injured by illegal governmental conduct are left without a complete remedy. Thus, to ensure that the government can be held fully accountable and deprived of any incentive to act illegally, there remains work left to be done to vindicate the Tennessee Constitution’s still-illusory guarantee that: “All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”
Nonetheless, it is clear at this point that Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-121 has ushered in a new era of governmental accountability across Tennessee. Thus, to everyone except government officials who behave illegally: Happy 1-3-121 Day to you and yours.
[1] When pressed during oral argument on the issue in the past, the Office of the Attorney General has been somewhat more candid about its actual position on the matter: It believes that “Colonial Pipeline was wrongfully decided,” and that it “is an overbroad decision.” See Transcript of Aug. 17, 2018 Hearing in Zarate v. The Tennessee Board of Cosmetology and Barber Examiners, Davidson County Chancery Court Case No. 18-534-II, p. 11, lines 9–13.
In an order issued earlier this afternoon, Davidson County Chancery Court Judge Ellen Hobbs Lyle ruled in favor of Plaintiffs Amy Frogge, Fran Bush, and Jill Speering, who earlier this year sued Metro and ex-MNPS Director Shawn Joseph over the legality of the School Board censorship clause contained in Joseph’s severance agreement. In a Memorandum Order, Chancellor Lyle struck down the censorship clause as unconstitutional on multiple grounds and permanently enjoined its enforcement.
Among other things, the clause prohibited elected School Board members even from truthfully criticizing “Dr. Joseph and his performance as Director of Schools.” Upon review of it, Chancellor Lyle ruled that the clause violated the Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, unlawfully prohibited them from speaking honestly with their constituents, and violated established Tennessee public policy. As a result, the clause was invalidated as unenforceable. Metro and Joseph will additionally be required to pay the Plaintiffs’ “reasonable costs and attorney’s fees,” which have been pledged to charity.
“This is a landmark victory on behalf of both elected officials’ free speech rights and citizens’ right to hear from their elected representatives,” said attorney Daniel Horwitz, who represented all three Plaintiffs. “Metro and Joseph should be ashamed of their efforts to gag elected officials and prevent them from speaking honestly with their constituents about issues of tremendous public importance, and their illegal attempt to do so should serve as a costly warning to other government officials to think twice before violating the First Amendment.”
Daniel Horwitz is a First Amendment lawyer who represents clients across Tennessee.
As readers of this blog will be aware, its editor has expanded its focus to topics well beyond the Tennessee Supreme Court. In an effort to focus coverage on free speech issues, the author has also started a separate blog—the Tennessee Free Speech Blog—devoted specifically to free speech cases across Tennessee. Recent posts from that blog are linked below:
On July 1, 2019, the Tennessee Public Participation Act—Tennessee’s first meaningful anti-SLAPP statute—took effect. The statute dramatically expanded the scope of speech that receives heightened legal protection in Tennessee. It also equips people targeted by Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPP-suits”) with important tools to secure the dismissal of meritless claims early on in litigation. Perhaps most importantly, the TPPA allows prevailing defendants to get their full attorney’s fees paid by a losing plaintiff if a petition to dismiss is granted. Previously, prevailing defendants were (generally) only able to recover a maximum of $10,000 under Tennessee’s frivolous lawsuit statute, and they were only eligible to do so if a plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
After Dr. Nandigam dismissed and then refiled his lawsuit against her, Ms. Beavers filed an immediate Petition to Dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims under the TPPA. Earlier this morning, her petition was granted. Thus, pending a potential appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, all of the Plaintiffs’ claims against her have been dismissed with prejudice.
“This is a huge win for Kelly Beavers and the First Amendment, and it’s a huge loss for Dr. Nandigam and anyone else who would abuse the legal process to promote censorship of honest, critical consumer reviews,” said Daniel Horwitz, a speech defense lawyer who represented Ms. Beavers. Ms. Beavers’ claims for attorney’s fees and sanctions against both Dr. Nandigam and his attorney, Bennett Hirschhorn (a real estate lawyer and landlord whose relevant First Amendment experience otherwise appears limited to having been charged with “distributing pornographic photographs” after graduating law school), remain pending.
Webster’s conviction has attracted widespread coverage due in part to its sensational details—a man serving a life sentence for a crime committed by his brother—and in part because the evidence of his innocence is overwhelming. Since being convicted, the lone witness who identified him as a perpetrator has recanted her identification of Webster multiple times. Further, four separate witnesses—including the brothers’ mother and the real perpetrator’s ex-girlfriend—have come forward to say that Webster’s brother not only confessed to committing the murder, but also bragged about doing so. DNA testing has additionally excluded Webster as a potential contributor to the DNA found on the murder weapon. Further, new eye witnesses have come forward to provide evidence that exculpates Webster and a description of the killer that does not match Webster at all. Separately, a treasure trove of new evidence points to two other individuals—Mr. Webster’s brother and his longtime right hand—as having being the real perpetrators who committed the crime, which still remains an unsolved cold case as to the second individual involved.
Webster’s original conviction review application is available here. Selected local media coverage from the case appears below.
Following a push to promote confidence in the election system, Nashville voters are using new voting machines to cast their votes in the August 1, 2019 Metro election. The purpose of the change was to enhance election integrity by giving voters a paper printout of their ballot choices that can be used to verify selections made on an electronic voting machine and to conduct a hand recount, if necessary. The rollout, however, has not gone as planned.
Earlier today, decorated News Channel 5 investigative reporter Phil Williams announced on Twitter that during the process of scanning his marked ballot, a poll worker had stared at it and was able to determine how he had voted, and that his wife had experienced the same issue:
My wife and I both had the same horrified reaction yesterday when we voted early in the Nashville election. The new system prints out your votes, then an election worker helps feed them into the scanner. In both cases, she was actually staring down at how we voted. Stop it NOW!— Phil Williams (@NC5PhilWilliams) July 21, 2019
You feed it into the scanner face-up, and there was an election worker standing right by the machine. In both our cases, she looked right down at the ballot as it was being fed into the machine.— Phil Williams (@NC5PhilWilliams) July 21, 2019
Thereafter, multiple other voters chimed in to report having the same experience. The issue—which appears to be due in large part to untrained or poorly trained poll workers who missed instructions that marked ballots are not to be touched and should be scanned by voters facedown—seriously compromises the secret ballot, prompting election advocacy group Tennesseans for Sensible Election Laws to issue a litigation threat to the Davidson County Election Commission:
The letter, in full, reads as follows:
TSEL STATEMENT ON NASHVILLE POLL WORKERS VIEWING
VOTERS’ MARKED BALLOTS
Following
reports from News Channel 5’s Phil Williams and other voters that poll workers
in Davidson County, Tennessee have been viewing voters’ marked ballots while
voters were feeding them into scanners, Daniel A. Horwitz, General Counsel for Tennesseans
for Sensible Election Laws,issued the following statement:
“Tennesseans
for Sensible Election Laws is deeply concerned about reports that Davidson
County poll workers have been viewing individual voters’ marked ballots as they
were being fed into scanners. It should
not even be possible for such a scenario to occur, much less actually occur in
practice.
The
secret ballot is critical to maintaining the integrity of Tennessee’s election process.
Ballot secrecy prevents illicit tactics
like vote-buying and ensures that voters will be comfortable voting for
whomever they please without fear of retaliation or intimidation. Simply put: The secret ballot is essential in
order to maintain both confidence in and the security of Tennessee’s entire
election process.
To protect
the secret ballot, Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-9-101(a) provides that: “A voting
machine to be used in Tennessee . . . must ensure voting in absolute secrecy.” Further, under Tenn. Code Ann. §
2-3-108(b)(1), paper ballots must be administered and arranged in such a way
“that it is impossible for any person to see a voter’s ballot while it is
being marked.”
Reports
by Phil Williams and others that their marked ballots were viewed by poll
workers while their votes were being counted make clear that Davidson County’s
new voting process does not comply with applicable ballot secrecy mandates. As a consequence, Tennesseans for Sensible
Election Laws demands that the Davidson County Election Commission take
immediate action to ensure that all marked ballots are fed into scanners facing
down and that poll workers are unable to view them under any
circumstances. Any election official who
attempts to view a voter’s marked ballot must be terminated. If the Davidson County Election Commission
does not take immediate action to maintain legally-mandated ballot secrecy, we
will take legal action yet again to protect Tennessee’s democratic process.”
Tennesseans for Sensible Election Laws is a nonpartisan group of concerned citizens who care about protecting Tennessee’s democratic process. Its mission is to ensure that Tennessee’s election and campaign finance statutes, policies, and regulations protect all Tennesseans’ rights to participate in the political process without unreasonable interference from the state government. Learn more at tn4sense.org.
Paid for by Tennesseans for Sensible Election Laws. David M. Morelli, Jr., Treasurer. Not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee, but we don’t think it should be a crime not to tell you that.
