Tennessee Supreme Court holds that insurance assignment clause was ineffective.

Contract Law, Tort Law,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

A Victim was injured in a car accident, and he sought chiropractic services from the Plaintiff, Action Chiropractic Clinic.  Prior to receiving the chiropractic services, the Victim signed a contract with an “Assignment of Rights” clause.  In pertinent part, the Assignment of Rights clause stated:

For treatment provided, I hereby require my Health Insurance, Auto Insurance, or any other party involved to pay by check and mail directly to: ACTION CHIROPRACTIC

. . . .

For the medical expense benefits allowable, and otherwise payable to me under the current Insurance Policy, as payment toward the total charges for Professional Services rendered.

The Assignment of Rights clause specifically named Erie Insurance Exchange as the policy holder.  Of note, however, Erie Insurance Exchange was not the Victim’s insurance company.  Instead, Erie Insurance Exchange was the insurance provider for the driver who had injured the Victim in the car accident.

Action Chiropractic Clinic ultimately charged the Victim $5,010.00 for its chiropractic services.  Shortly thereafter, Erie Insurance Exchange entered into a settlement with the Victim and paid him $8,510.00 for all claims relating to the car accident.  However, neither the Victim nor Erie Insurance Exchange paid Action Chiropractic Clinic anything for the chiropractic services that it rendered to the Victim.  As a result, Action Chiropractic Clinic sued both the Victim and Erie Insurance Exchange seeking payment, among other things, under the “Assignment of Rights” provision. Continue reading Tennessee Supreme Court holds that insurance assignment clause was ineffective. →

Can Rep. Womick Impeach Governor Haslam and U.S. Supreme Court Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy and Sotomayor over the same-sex marriage ruling?

Constitutional Law, SCOTUS, Uncategorized, ,

Can Rep. Womick impeach Governor Haslam and U.S. Supreme Court Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Kennedy and Sotomayor over the same-sex marriage ruling?

In a word:  No.

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Jury’s verdict that CSX was liable for negligently causing a former employee’s lung cancer will stand, but CSX is entitled to a new trial addressing damages, holds Tennessee Supreme Court.

Tort Law, ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

A massive jury verdict finding the railroad company CSX liable for causing a former employee’s lung cancer will stand, but CSX is entitled to a new trial on the damages awarded to the employee’s widow, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has held.

Between 1962 and 2003, Winston Payne worked for CSX Transportation as a switchman, a switch foreman, and a brakeman.  Less than three years after he retired, he was diagnosed with lung cancer.  In 2007, Mr. Payne filed a lawsuit against CSX both under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and based on a common law negligence theory, alleging that CSX had negligently exposed him to asbestos, diesel engine exhaust fumes, and radioactive materials, and further alleging that CSX had violated several statutes and regulations designed to protect the safety of railroad employees.  According to Mr. Payne, all of these failures contributed to his developing lung cancer.

In contrast, CSX contended that Mr. Payne had instead developed lung cancer due to his history of cigarette smoking.  Furthermore, CSX contended if the jury decided to award damages to Mr. Payne based upon its negligence, then any damages award should be reduced by virtue of the impact of Mr. Payne’s cigarette smoking.  Mr. Payne died from lung cancer in 2010, and his widow continued the lawsuit in his place.

During the trial, the late Mr. Payne’s legal team Continue reading Jury’s verdict that CSX was liable for negligently causing a former employee’s lung cancer will stand, but CSX is entitled to a new trial addressing damages, holds Tennessee Supreme Court. →

Does the Constitution prevent Nashville from enacting a local hire law? Yes, it probably does.

Constitutional Law, , , , ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

On August 6, 2015, Davidson County voters will head to the polls to vote on Metro Charter Amendment 3, which has been dubbed the “local hire” amendment.  If enacted, the crux of Amendment 3 is that 40% of the work performed on taxpayer-funded construction projects within Davidson County would legally have to be set aside for Davidson County residents.

In recent weeks, opposing advocates have expressed their views on Charter Amendment 3 in editorials published in The Tennessean.  First, on June 22, 2015, union organizer and community activist Ashford Hughes penned the op ed: “[A] Vote for Charter Amendment 3 is [a] vote for local jobs,” in which he argued – among other things – that “[i]t makes no sense to bring in out-of-county and out-of-state hires when so many Nashville construction workers, engineers and skilled tradesmen and women are out of work.”  Making the contrary case, on June 30, 2015, Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce President Ralph Schulz penned the op ed: “Vote no on Amendment 3: It sounds good, but won’t work,” contending that the measure “would translate to longer delays on Metro construction projects and more money coming out of taxpayers’ pockets.”  Various other interested parties have also weighed in on the matter in recent days, disputing the referendum’s likely policy ramifications.

What has largely flown under the radar to this point, however, are the constitutional implications of the proposed local hire amendment, which are substantial.[1]  The text of the proposed amendment is a doozie, but in full, it reads as follows: Continue reading Does the Constitution prevent Nashville from enacting a local hire law? Yes, it probably does. →

FedEx can deliver HCLA pre-suit notice letters, too, holds Tennessee Supreme Court

Health Care Liability Act, ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

In yet another round of litigation concerning Tennessee’s medical malpractice statute (known as the Health Care Liability Act, or the HCLA), the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that litigants may use commercial carriers like FedEx to deliver pre-suit notice letters.  This holding is significant because the HCLA specifically provides that pre-suit notice letters must be delivered by “the United States postal service.”[1]  Thus, by excusing a plaintiff’s technical non-compliance with the HCLA’s  service requirement, the Court’s decision in Arden v. Kozawa represents a further extension of the “substantial compliance doctrine,” which this author has previously described as “the rule that ‘close is close enough.’”[2]  Furthermore, Arden represents yet another iteration of the Court’s view that “[s]o long as a health care defendant is not prejudiced” by a plaintiff’s procedural errors, “substantial compliance with . . . statutory requirements will suffice.”[3]

The underlying law in Arden was not in dispute.  Before filing a medical malpractice claim, Tennessee law “require[s] medical malpractice plaintiffs to satisfy six pre-suit ‘notice requirements[.]’”[4] Those requirements include, for example, providing a medical malpractice defendant (usually a doctor or a hospital): (1) “[t]he full name and date of birth of the patient whose treatment is at issue;”[5] (2) “[t]he name and address of the attorney sending the notice, if applicable;”[6] and (3) “[a] HIPAA compliant medical authorization permitting the provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from each other provider being sent a notice.”[7]  Of note, the HCLA also states that plaintiffs must demonstrate that pre-suit notice was actually provided to defendants through either “[p]ersonal delivery of the notice”[8] or “[m]ailing of the notice.”[9]

If a plaintiff chooses to mail the notice, rather than hand-delivering it (something that avoids a great deal of angst, as nobody—doctors included—enjoys being personally served with notice of an impending lawsuit), then the HCLA states that proof of mailing: “shall be demonstrated by filing a certificate of mailing from the United States postal service[.]”[10]  In Arden, the plaintiff’s attorney admitted that Continue reading FedEx can deliver HCLA pre-suit notice letters, too, holds Tennessee Supreme Court →

Tennessee’s Double Jeopardy standard may be applied retroactively, holds Tennessee Supreme Court

Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, , , , ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz:

On May 27, 2010, Terrence Feaster savagely beat his housemate, dragged her into a bedroom, tied her feet to an entertainment center, and threatened to kill her if she moved.  Mr. Feaster was subsequently arrested and indicted for his crimes.  Following a trial, a jury convicted him of voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment.  Over Mr. Feaster’s objection, the trial court declined to “merge” any of his convictions, meaning that it did not eliminate any of them for being duplicative.

Approximately two years after Mr. Feaster’s crimes, the Tennessee Supreme Court decided State v. Watkins.[1]  Watkins adopted a new test for determining when multiple convictions for offenses that arise under different statutes must be merged in order to avoid violating Tennessee’s Double Jeopardy clause.[2]  Importantly, Watkins also expressly abandoned the earlier (four-factor) merger test that the Tennessee Supreme Court had established in State v. Denton.[3]   For various reasons, the Denton rule was more favorable to criminal defendants than the Watkins rule, which is now in effect today.  Under the current Watkins standard, courts must conduct the following three-factor inquiry to determine whether a defendant’s convictions must be merged:

First: “Tennessee courts must focus upon ascertaining legislative intent.  If the General Assembly has expressed an intent to permit [or not to permit] multiple punishment, no further analysis will be necessary, and multiple convictions should be upheld against a double jeopardy challenge.”[4]

Second: Continue reading Tennessee’s Double Jeopardy standard may be applied retroactively, holds Tennessee Supreme Court →

SCOTUS Decision Day Roundup: Supreme Court upholds ACA subsidies and approves disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act.

Constitutional Law, SCOTUS,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

Today was a major decision day at the Supreme Court of the United States.  Although the Court released only two opinions, both of today’s decisions carry enormous social import in Tennessee and throughout the nation.  Each also represents a major victory for the Obama Administration, which secured wins in support of its health care and housing policies.  The day’s two decisions were as follows:

1.  King v. Burwell (6-3):

In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“the ACA”), which has since been derided by many as “Obamacare.”  Among other provisions of the law, the ACA sought to make insurance more affordable by giving refundable tax credits to individuals with household incomes that fell between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line.

The ACA also required the creation of an “Exchange” in each state, which is essentially a marketplace that allows people to compare and purchase health insurance plans.  The Act afforded each state the option of establishing its own Exchange, but it also provided that the federal government would establish “such Exchange” if a state chose not to establish its own exchange.  At issue in this case, the ACA further provided that tax credits “shall be allowed” to any “applicable taxpayer,” but only if the taxpayer had enrolled in an insurance plan through “an Exchange established by the State[.]”  Thus, the specific question presented in this case was whether tax credits would be available on all exchanges, or whether they would only  apply to exchanges established by states.

Held:  Tax credits are available to individuals in states that have a federal exchange.   According to the Supreme Court:  “Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them.”  Consequently, based on the “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,” tax credits are available to individuals who purchase health insurance on either a federally-created or a state-created insurance exchange.

Special commentary and Tennessee connections:  The importance of the Supreme Court’s decision in King v. Burwell cannot be overstated.  In light of the continuing controversy surrounding the Affordable Care Act, this decision carries tremendous social and political significance.  Consequently, Continue reading SCOTUS Decision Day Roundup: Supreme Court upholds ACA subsidies and approves disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act. →

No, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent re-trial in the Vanderbilt rape case.

Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, , , , ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

Yesterday, Judge Monte Watkins declared a mistrial in the consolidated prosecutions of Cory Batey and Brandon Vandenburg, which have come to be known collectively as “the Vanderbilt rape case.”  Judge Watkins’ eight-page mistrial order is accessible here.  As explained in detail in this post from last week, Tennessee law presumes jurors to be biased when they give false statements or fail to be forthcoming in response to questions asked during jury selection, and under such circumstances, a new trial is appropriate regardless of the strength of the evidence that was presented.   In this case, the juror in question appears to have lied several times in response to a wide array of questions that he was asked during voir dire.  For example, in page six of Judge Watkins’ ruling, he explains: “[I]t would be difficult to believe that Juror #9 did not [recall] his involvement in a statutory rape case when sexual assault, rape, and unwanted sexual touching [were] mentioned over one hundred and four times during the course of voir dire.”

Following Judge Watkins’ mistrial declaration, several observers have inquired whether the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from re-trying the two defendants.  It does not.  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, barring bad-faith or prosecutorial misconduct, “a mistrial ruling explicitly contemplates reprosecution of the defendant.”  United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 476 (1971).  As the Supreme Court has explained: Continue reading No, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent re-trial in the Vanderbilt rape case. →

SCOTUS Decision Day Roundup: Spider-Man royalties, raisin takings, and some Supreme Court humor

Constitutional Law, SCOTUS, , ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

The Supreme Court of the United States issued four opinions today that addressed patent royalty payments, administrative searches of hotel guest logs, use of force against detainees, and the application of the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause to personal property.

A few of the Justices also offered a rare, entertaining glimpse into Supreme Court humor.  “[H]aving the Court of Appeals calculate ‘just compensation’ in this case would be a fruitless exercise,” Justice Thomas wrote in a concurring opinion involving government takings of raisins.  “In this world, with great power there must also come—great responsibility,” quoted Justice Kagan in a case involving royalties over a Spider-Man toy, who also quipped that “[p]atents endow their holders with certain superpowers,” and that “[t]he parties had contemplated that royalties would continue for as long as kids want to imitate Spider-Man (by doing whatever a spider can).”  The day’s four opinions were as follows: Continue reading SCOTUS Decision Day Roundup: Spider-Man royalties, raisin takings, and some Supreme Court humor →

Is Nashville’s Airbnb Ordinance Constitutional?  Maybe not. 

Constitutional Law, ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

A few weeks ago, Lindsay Boyd penned a fun article for the Beacon Center TN Blog about Nashville’s new Airbnb ordinance entitled “My Dog Has More Freedom Than You Do.”  Contrasting Nashville’s newly enacted “Short Term Rental Property” regulations with the comparatively regulation-free environment available to short term dog sitters, Ms. Boyd explains:

“[T]hose of us residing in Nashville will no longer have the same freedoms that our pets do to shop for accommodations or open our homes to prospective vacation renters.  This spring, the city of Nashville announced a new policy for Airbnb operations.

Now, not only do Airbnb operators have to pay the same taxes as hotels, but those whose homes are used strictly for “short term rentals” (or Airbnb business) must also stand in line to vie for a limited number of licenses granted by the city—available to a mere 3% of households per census tract.  Those who fail to obtain these permits and adapt their services to adhere to further regulations on the number of sleeping rooms, signage, parking, and food service, will simply be out of luck—or become outlaws if they continue to operate unabated.”

After reviewing the provisions of Nashville’s short term rental property ordinance, however, I began to wonder:  can Nashville’s Airbnb regulations withstand constitutional scrutiny?  From my vantage point – at least with respect to the provision of the ordinance that caps the total number of short term rental permits at “[n]o more than three percent of the single-family or detached two-family residential units within each census tract”[1] – the answer is no. Continue reading Is Nashville’s Airbnb Ordinance Constitutional?  Maybe not.  →