Tag Archives: Constitutional Law

SCOTUS Decision Day Roundup: Supreme Court upholds ACA subsidies and approves disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act.

Constitutional Law, SCOTUS,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

Today was a major decision day at the Supreme Court of the United States.  Although the Court released only two opinions, both of today’s decisions carry enormous social import in Tennessee and throughout the nation.  Each also represents a major victory for the Obama Administration, which secured wins in support of its health care and housing policies.  The day’s two decisions were as follows:

1.  King v. Burwell (6-3):

In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“the ACA”), which has since been derided by many as “Obamacare.”  Among other provisions of the law, the ACA sought to make insurance more affordable by giving refundable tax credits to individuals with household incomes that fell between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line.

The ACA also required the creation of an “Exchange” in each state, which is essentially a marketplace that allows people to compare and purchase health insurance plans.  The Act afforded each state the option of establishing its own Exchange, but it also provided that the federal government would establish “such Exchange” if a state chose not to establish its own exchange.  At issue in this case, the ACA further provided that tax credits “shall be allowed” to any “applicable taxpayer,” but only if the taxpayer had enrolled in an insurance plan through “an Exchange established by the State[.]”  Thus, the specific question presented in this case was whether tax credits would be available on all exchanges, or whether they would only  apply to exchanges established by states.

Held:  Tax credits are available to individuals in states that have a federal exchange.   According to the Supreme Court:  “Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them.”  Consequently, based on the “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,” tax credits are available to individuals who purchase health insurance on either a federally-created or a state-created insurance exchange.

Special commentary and Tennessee connections:  The importance of the Supreme Court’s decision in King v. Burwell cannot be overstated.  In light of the continuing controversy surrounding the Affordable Care Act, this decision carries tremendous social and political significance.  Consequently, Continue reading SCOTUS Decision Day Roundup: Supreme Court upholds ACA subsidies and approves disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act. →

No, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent re-trial in the Vanderbilt rape case.

Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, , , , ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

Yesterday, Judge Monte Watkins declared a mistrial in the consolidated prosecutions of Cory Batey and Brandon Vandenburg, which have come to be known collectively as “the Vanderbilt rape case.”  Judge Watkins’ eight-page mistrial order is accessible here.  As explained in detail in this post from last week, Tennessee law presumes jurors to be biased when they give false statements or fail to be forthcoming in response to questions asked during jury selection, and under such circumstances, a new trial is appropriate regardless of the strength of the evidence that was presented.   In this case, the juror in question appears to have lied several times in response to a wide array of questions that he was asked during voir dire.  For example, in page six of Judge Watkins’ ruling, he explains: “[I]t would be difficult to believe that Juror #9 did not [recall] his involvement in a statutory rape case when sexual assault, rape, and unwanted sexual touching [were] mentioned over one hundred and four times during the course of voir dire.”

Following Judge Watkins’ mistrial declaration, several observers have inquired whether the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from re-trying the two defendants.  It does not.  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, barring bad-faith or prosecutorial misconduct, “a mistrial ruling explicitly contemplates reprosecution of the defendant.”  United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 476 (1971).  As the Supreme Court has explained: Continue reading No, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent re-trial in the Vanderbilt rape case. →

SCOTUS Decision Day Roundup: Spider-Man royalties, raisin takings, and some Supreme Court humor

Constitutional Law, SCOTUS, , ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

The Supreme Court of the United States issued four opinions today that addressed patent royalty payments, administrative searches of hotel guest logs, use of force against detainees, and the application of the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause to personal property.

A few of the Justices also offered a rare, entertaining glimpse into Supreme Court humor.  “[H]aving the Court of Appeals calculate ‘just compensation’ in this case would be a fruitless exercise,” Justice Thomas wrote in a concurring opinion involving government takings of raisins.  “In this world, with great power there must also come—great responsibility,” quoted Justice Kagan in a case involving royalties over a Spider-Man toy, who also quipped that “[p]atents endow their holders with certain superpowers,” and that “[t]he parties had contemplated that royalties would continue for as long as kids want to imitate Spider-Man (by doing whatever a spider can).”  The day’s four opinions were as follows: Continue reading SCOTUS Decision Day Roundup: Spider-Man royalties, raisin takings, and some Supreme Court humor →

Is Nashville’s Airbnb Ordinance Constitutional?  Maybe not. 

Constitutional Law, ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

A few weeks ago, Lindsay Boyd penned a fun article for the Beacon Center TN Blog about Nashville’s new Airbnb ordinance entitled “My Dog Has More Freedom Than You Do.”  Contrasting Nashville’s newly enacted “Short Term Rental Property” regulations with the comparatively regulation-free environment available to short term dog sitters, Ms. Boyd explains:

“[T]hose of us residing in Nashville will no longer have the same freedoms that our pets do to shop for accommodations or open our homes to prospective vacation renters.  This spring, the city of Nashville announced a new policy for Airbnb operations.

Now, not only do Airbnb operators have to pay the same taxes as hotels, but those whose homes are used strictly for “short term rentals” (or Airbnb business) must also stand in line to vie for a limited number of licenses granted by the city—available to a mere 3% of households per census tract.  Those who fail to obtain these permits and adapt their services to adhere to further regulations on the number of sleeping rooms, signage, parking, and food service, will simply be out of luck—or become outlaws if they continue to operate unabated.”

After reviewing the provisions of Nashville’s short term rental property ordinance, however, I began to wonder:  can Nashville’s Airbnb regulations withstand constitutional scrutiny?  From my vantage point – at least with respect to the provision of the ordinance that caps the total number of short term rental permits at “[n]o more than three percent of the single-family or detached two-family residential units within each census tract”[1] – the answer is no. Continue reading Is Nashville’s Airbnb Ordinance Constitutional?  Maybe not.  →