Tag Archives: Daniel Horwitz

Metro Can Sue Its Own Zoning Board, Holds Tennessee Supreme Court

Civil Procedure,

By Daniel Horwitz:

In March 2012, an advertising company applied to Metro’s Department of Codes and Building Safety for two digital display billboard permits.  The Department’s Zoning Administrator denied the company’s two permit requests, so the company appealed the denial to Metro’s Board of Zoning Appeals (“the Board”).  On a 4-2 vote, the Board overturned the Zoning Administrator’s decision, and it granted the company the two digital display permits that it sought.

Unhappy with the Board’s decision, Metro Legal filed a lawsuit against the Board and various other parties under the appeal provision set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101, which governs zoning appeals.  In response, the parties that Metro Legal sued filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the basis that Metro “does not have standing to bring suit [against its] own Board.”  The trial court granted the parties’ motion to dismiss, finding that Metro did not have a legal right to appeal the Board’s decision under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101.  Further, the trial court held that Metro had not suffered an injury, which is a necessary precondition to filing any kind of lawsuit.  As a result, Metro Legal appealed the trial court’s decision to dismiss its lawsuit to the Tennessee Court of Appeals, and the case ultimately reached the Tennessee Supreme Court.

1.  Metro’s Right to Appeal Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101

The statute governing zoning appeals provides broadly that: “Anyone who may be aggrieved by any final order or judgment of any board or commission . . . may have the order or judgment reviewed by the courts, where not otherwise specifically provided, in the manner provided by this chapter.”[1]  Thus, the first question presented was whether the term “anyone” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 included Metro.

Reviewing the applicable statutory text, the Tennessee Supreme Court easily concluded that for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101, “anyone” did indeed include Metro.  Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Bivins explained that:  “Section 101 refers to ‘anyone,’ and we conclude that Metro, a public corporation, falls within the scope of the term ‘anyone.’”  Further, he noted, “[e]ven were we to construe ‘anyone’ as referring to ‘persons,’ the Tennessee Code defines ‘person’ as including corporations[, and] Metro is a public corporation[.]”  Accordingly, he reasoned, Metro enjoys the right to pursue zoning appeals under Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 just like anyone else.

Seeking a contrary holding, Metro’s opposing litigants highlighted the fact that the legislature had considered – but failed to enact – a separate version of the zoning appeal statute that would have expressly afforded municipalities the right to appeal.  By opting not to enact that version, they argued, the legislature must have intended to deny municipalities the right to appeal zoning decisions.  Rejecting this line of reasoning, however, the Court explained that it was “[un]aware of any [] authority limiting the definition of the term ‘anyone’ . . .  to exclude Metro as a potential petitioner.”[2]

2.  Metro’s Injury

Having established that Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 affords Metro the right to seek judicial review of zoning decisions under circumstances when it has been “aggrieved,” the next question to be decided was whether it is even possible for Metro “to be aggrieved by an erroneous decision made by one of its own boards.”  Holding in the affirmative, the Court explained that “when applied to local governments, aggrievement encompasses interference with a local government’s ability to fulfill its statutory obligations, or substantial, direct, and adverse effects on the local government in its corporate capacity.”  Since Metro alleged in its complaint that the Zoning Board’s decision would interfere with its duty to enforce municipal zoning ordinances, the Court concluded that Metro had alleged an injury sufficient to justify judicial review.  Specifically, the court explained:

“Metro has established that it is ‘aggrieved’ by its allegation that, if the [Board’s] ruling is allowed to stand, it will be unable to enforce certain of its ordinances.  That allegation is within Section 101‟s zone of interests. Accordingly, Metro has established its standing to bring this action under Section 101.”

3.  Policy Considerations

In holding that Metro has the legal right to appeal decisions made by the Board of Zoning Appeals, the Court also relied heavily on a single crucial policy consideration:  the fact that a contrary result would mean that only wealthy individuals would be able to appeal adverse zoning decisions.  Specifically, the Court noted, if Metro did not have the right to appeal Board decisions on behalf of taxpayers, then only individuals or entities with sufficient resources to file a lawsuit would be able to challenge the Board in court.  Rejecting this result as unacceptable, the Court explained that it was “persuaded particularly” by the concern that:

“The enforcement of a governmental body’s zoning code should not depend upon the economic status of individuals.  Indeed, such a scenario stands to defeat the very purpose of a zoning code.”

The Court’s sensitivity to the fact that legal rights should not be a function of poverty is welcome and should be applauded by all.  One can only hope, however, that its concern for indigent citizens will extend beyond those affected by zoning decisions.  It is well documented, for example, that within the criminal justice system, outcomes that should depend exclusively on guilt or innocence are instead highly dependent on a defendant’s economic status—leading inexorably to the conclusion that “[t]here is a crisis in legal representation for the poor throughout the country.”[3]  Similarly, on behalf of several domestic and sexual violence prevention advocates who are seeking to protect rape victims from having their most sensitive personal information disclosed, the author has beseeched the Justices to recognize that “the vast majority of victims of sexual and domestic violence lack the means to retain private counsel to protect their rights in any—much less every—phase of Tennessee’s justice system.”  See Tennessean v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, No. M-2014-00524-SC-R11-CV, Brief of Amici Curiae Domestic and Sexual Violence Prevention Advocates 32, available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=daniel_horwitz.  Accordingly, these advocates have implored the Court to hold that rape survivors should benefit from a presumption in favor of non-disclosure with respect to their private, personal information, rather than being forced to hire an attorney to protect their rights in the event that someone seeks access to their private records.

Whether the Court will take citizens’ poverty and economic status into consideration outside the context of zoning disputes, however, only time will tell.

Read the Tennessee Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in Metro. Gov’t of Nashville-Davidson Cty. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Nashville here.

Questions about this article?  Email Daniel Horwitz at [email protected].

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[1] Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101.

[2] In the author’s view, a much stronger argument would have been that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-206 – which governs the first step of the zoning appeals process – specifically affords “municipalit[ies]” the right to appeal, while Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-101 – which governs the second step of the zoning appeals process – does not.  Pursuant to the doctrine of in pari materia, one could argue persuasively that this conspicuous difference indicates that the legislature intended for the two provisions to function differently.  See, e.g., Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547, 560 (Tenn. 2013) (holding that where to statutory provisions are “enacted together,” “the doctrine of in pari materia requires us to interpret the[] two sections together. . . . Although legislative silence is not generally indicative of an intent not to act, legislative silence in [] context offers a strong suggestion that the legislature intend[s provisions to] function differently.”) (internal citations omitted).

[3] Stephen B. Bright, The Right to Counsel in Death Penalty and Other Criminal Cases: Neglect of the Most Fundamental Right and What We Should Do About It, 11 J.L. SOC’Y 1, 3 (2010), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4457&context=fss_papers.

Tennessee Supreme Court gives trial courts more latitude in determining proper sanctions for spoliation of evidence.

Civil Procedure, ,

By Daniel Horwitz:

On March 3rd, 2008, Lee Ann Tatham purchased two new Bridgestone tires in Murfreesboro, Tennessee.  Unfortunately, however, less than three months later, one of the two tires failed while she was driving on the interstate, causing her to spin out.  Thereafter, Ms. Tatham’s car careened across the highway, struck a guardrail, flipped, and landed in a ditch.  Ms. Tatham survived the accident, but she suffered a broken back as a result of it.

Because her car was completely totaled in the accident, Ms. Tatham’s insurance company advised her to transfer the title of her vehicle to the wrecker service that had towed it away.  The wrecker service subsequently destroyed her vehicle – including the defective tire – as part of its routine practice.  Ms. Tatham did not seek to have the tire destroyed by the wrecker service, and she did not know that it would be.  Additionally, because she had not yet hired an attorney, Ms. Tatham was not aware that she was supposed to have the defective tire preserved as evidence.

Eventually, Ms. Tatham brought a products liability lawsuit against Bridgestone seeking compensation for her injuries.  Thereafter, Bridgestone filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Tatham’s lawsuit on the basis that the tire at issue had improperly been destroyed.  The trial court denied Bridgestone’s motion, and it permitted Ms. Tatham’s case to go forward.  This appeal followed.

Spoliation of Evidence

As a general matter, people are not allowed to destroy evidence that will be relevant to a future legal proceeding.  Failing to preserve evidence – or, in legal parlance, “spoliation of evidence” – exposes a litigant to being sanctioned once the legal proceeding begins.[1]  In Tennessee, the range of potential remedies that a trial court can use to punish a party for destroying evidence is extensive.  Possible sanctions include “dismissal of the action, rendering a judgment by default, limiting the introduction of certain claims or evidence, entering an order designating that certain facts shall be taken as established, and striking out pleadings or parts of pleadings.”[2]

Broadly speaking, trial sanctions for spoliation of evidence are intended to serve two purposes.  First, they “attempt[] to place the non-spoliator in a position similar to where it would have been prior to the destruction of evidence.”[3]  Second, Continue reading Tennessee Supreme Court gives trial courts more latitude in determining proper sanctions for spoliation of evidence. →

In its most consequential ruling of the year, Tennessee Supreme Court modifies Tennessee’s summary judgment standard, adopts federal “put up or shut up” rule.

Civil Procedure, Tennessee Constitutional Law, ,

By Daniel Horwitz:

Concluding in Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis that the seven-year-old summary judgment standard established by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co. had proven to be “unworkable” and “functioned in practice to frustrate the purposes for which summary judgment was intended,” the Court has officially overruled Hannan effective immediately.[1]  In its place, the Court “fully embrace[d]” the summary judgment standard that has been used in federal cases since 1986.[2]

The federal summary judgment standard empowers litigants to force their opponents to “put up [evidence] or shut up” before trial.[3]  If, in response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the responding (“nonmoving”) party is unable to muster sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of a material fact that requires a trial, then summary judgment must be granted in favor of the moving party.  In contrast, under the prior Hannan standard, several courts had concluded that “it is not enough to rely on the nonmoving party’s lack of proof even . . . after the deadline for discovery ha[s] passed.  Under Hannan, we are required to assume that the nonmoving party may still, by the time of trial, somehow come up with evidence to support [a] claim.”[4]  After determining that this standard was “unworkable and inconsistent with the history and text of Tennessee Rule [of Civil Procedure] 56,”[5] a majority of the Court concluded that Hannan should be overruled.

In all likelihood,[6] the immediate effect of the Court’s decision in Rye will be to increase the number of cases that are decided at the summary judgment stage.  Thus, fewer cases will end up going to trial and being decided by a jury, and litigants are less likely to settle claims.  Helpfully, the Tennessee Supreme Court’s “full[] embrace” of the federal summary judgment standard also harmonizes state and federal civil procedure, and it finally settles an area of law that had created a substantial degree of confusion among both lower courts and the Justices of the Tennessee Supreme Court themselves.[7] Continue reading In its most consequential ruling of the year, Tennessee Supreme Court modifies Tennessee’s summary judgment standard, adopts federal “put up or shut up” rule. →

Tennessee Supreme Court voids judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction; establishes standard for determining when void judgments are still binding.

Family Law, Judgments, ,

By Daniel Horwitz:

After a short marriage, Kevin Turner and Stephanie Turner divorced on October 19, 2000.  Full custody of their two children was awarded to Mr. Turner, and Mrs. Turner was directed to pay Mr. Turner child support.  However, the couple’s divorce decree also provided that Mrs. Turner was entitled to visitation “during such periods of visitation as may be awarded.”

By July 2001, Mrs. Turner had left Tennessee and had lost all contact with Mr. Turner and their children.  Mrs. Turner also failed to pay Mr. Turner any child support, and she stopped seeking visitation.  Consequently, Mr. Turner filed a petition to terminate Mrs. Turner’s parental rights over their children.  Because Mrs. Turner had moved, however, the summons that was issued to alert her of Mr. Turner’s petition was returned undelivered.

Having been unable to provide Mrs. Turner with personal service of his petition to terminate her parental rights, Mr. Turner attempted to give Mrs. Turner “constructive” notice of his petition by publication.  Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 21–1–203(a)(5), personal service is not required “[w]hen the residence of the defendant is unknown and cannot be ascertained upon diligent inquiry.”  However, to be excused from the personal service requirement, a litigant must describe his diligent efforts to provide personal service under oath or in a separate affidavit.[1]  Additionally, a separate statute that applies specifically to parental termination proceedings provides that any request to authorize constructive notice through publication “shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the petitioners or their legal counsel attesting, in detail, to all efforts to determine the identity and whereabouts of the part[y] against whom substituted service is sought.”[2] Continue reading Tennessee Supreme Court voids judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction; establishes standard for determining when void judgments are still binding. →

All claims related to the provision of health care are now governed by the Health Care Liability Act, holds Tennessee Supreme Court.

Health Care Liability Act, Tort Law,

By Daniel Horwitz:

In February of 2012, the Juvenile Court of Sumner County awarded temporary custody of “M.L.” – a minor child – to her great aunt and uncle.  However, the Court’s custody order also provided that M.L.’s biological parents – Adam and Ashley Ellithorpe – were permitted to participate in any counseling that she received.  After the Ellithorpes discovered that M.L. had received counseling for approximately two years without their knowledge, however, they sued M.L.’s counselor – Ms. Janet Weismark – for negligence.  According to M.L.’s parents, Ms. Weismark – a licensed clinical social worker – acted recklessly and caused their daughter substantial harm by providing her counseling services without first obtaining their consent to do so.

After receiving the Ellithorpes’ complaint, Ms. Weismark asked the court to dismiss it on the basis that the Ellithorpes had failed to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements of the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (the “HCLA”).  In Tennessee, people who want to file lawsuits involving the provision of health care services are first required to comply with a variety of procedural requirements that are unique to health care claims.[1]  Given that the HCLA’s pre-suit notice requirements serve as a minefield to unwary litigants and frequently result in otherwise-valid claims being dismissed on technical procedural grounds, the author has previously characterized these requirements as “red tape with fangs.”  See Daniel A. Horwitz, The Law of Unintended Consequences:  Avoiding the Health Care Liability Act Booby Trap, Nashville Bar Journal (June 2015) (feature article), available at http://issuu.com/nbanikki/docs/nbjjune15/17.

Chief among the HCLA’s pre-suit notice requirements is a rule that “[i]n any health care liability action in which expert testimony is required by § 29-26-115, the plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel shall file a certificate of good faith with the complaint.”[2]  This rule requires a plaintiff to certify that before filing the lawsuit, the plaintiff consulted at least one medical expert who concluded that there was a good faith basis to pursue the claim.[3]  Tennessee law also provides that a plaintiff’s failure to comply with this requirement results in his or her complaint being dismissed with prejudice,[4] which means that the lawsuit is over and it can never be brought again.

Continue reading All claims related to the provision of health care are now governed by the Health Care Liability Act, holds Tennessee Supreme Court. →

Five Pennsylvania insurance companies recoup $16 million in tax payments after Tennessee Supreme Court holds that retaliatory taxes were improperly assessed

Business Law, Tax Law, , ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

The American insurance industry is unique in many ways.[1]  Included among its quirks is an interlocking, state-by-state “retaliatory tax” framework that ensures that equally low taxes will be levied on insurance companies across the country no matter where they do business.  The gist of this “retaliatory tax” system is that if one state decides to impose a comparatively more onerous tax on insurance companies, then every other state will punish that state’s insurance companies by imposing a retaliatory tax against them in response.  With the sole exception of Hawaii, every state has enacted a retaliatory insurance tax statute for this purpose.[2]

To illustrate the practical effect of this framework by way of example, suppose that Alabama and Tennessee each tax insurance companies in exactly the same way, and further, that some number of Alabama insurance companies do business in Tennessee (and vice versa).  To close a budget deficit, however, Alabama decides to raise taxes on insurance companies that do business in Alabama.  Thereafter, in response, Tennessee’s “retaliatory tax” statute authorizes Tennessee’s insurance commissioner to levy a punitive tax on all of the Alabama insurance companies that do business in Tennessee.[3]  Additionally, every other state (except Hawaii) would punish Alabama’s insurance companies in exactly the same way.[4]  Considered broadly, this practice has been described as “holding hostages to coerce another sovereign to change its policies.”[5] Continue reading Five Pennsylvania insurance companies recoup $16 million in tax payments after Tennessee Supreme Court holds that retaliatory taxes were improperly assessed →

In 4-1 ruling, Tennessee Supreme Court holds that procedural obstacles keep Clarksville man’s claim out of court

Tort Law, , ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

Case Background

On the evening of December 24, 2009, Richard Moreno was driving his car across the Neal Tarpley Bridge in Clarksville when a massive tree suddenly slammed on top of his car, seriously injuring him.  The tree had been planted on property owned by the State of Tennessee.  As a result, in accordance with the Tennessee Claims Commission Act,[1] Mr. Moreno filed a claim with the Claims Administration describing his injuries and providing an accounting of his medical expenses.

After filing his claim, Mr. Moreno received an order from the Claims Commissioner directing him to file a formal complaint against the State of Tennessee.  Mr. Moreno promptly complied by filing a complaint alleging that the State had negligently maintained both the bridge and the tree that fell on him.  Thereafter, the State filed an answer to Mr. Moreno’s complaint denying liability.

Notably, the State’s initial answer to Mr. Moreno’s complaint never mentioned that someone else might be responsible for the accident.  However, sixteen months later, the State amended its answer and alleged for the first time that the City of Clarksville was responsible for Mr. Moreno’s injuries because water run-off from a city storm drain had eroded the soil around the bridge, rendering the tree that fell on him unstable.

Continue reading In 4-1 ruling, Tennessee Supreme Court holds that procedural obstacles keep Clarksville man’s claim out of court →

In controversial 3-2 decision, Tennessee Supreme Court affirms death penalty conviction that is virtually certain to be overturned by a federal court.

Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, Evidence, , , ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

Like all capital cases, the circumstances of Starr Harris’s death were horrific.  On June 1, 2010, Ms. Harris was brutally murdered in the woods outside her home.  The cause of her death was “strangulation associated with blunt force injuries,” and her body exhibited signs of “extensive trauma to [her] neck and [her] upper torso.”  Ms. Harris also had a “gaping” laceration on the right side of her head with a skull fracture beneath it.  There was blood under two of Ms. Harris’s fingernails, providing evidence of a struggle.  Additionally, the front of Ms. Harris’s shirt had been ripped open while her bra had been pulled down to her waist—possibly suggesting evidence of rape.  It goes without saying that the senseless brutality of Ms. Harris’s murder defies explanation.

Based on a combination of Ms. Harris’s phone records and the testimony of a FedEx employee who had unsuccessfully attempted to deliver a package to her on the afternoon of her death, the time of Ms. Harris’s murder was pegged sometime between 1:30 p.m. and 2:16 p.m.  Unfortunately, there were no witnesses to Ms. Harris’s murder, and no direct evidence indicated who might have committed it.  As is common in murder cases, however, Ms. Harris’s husband—Thomas Harris—was immediately investigated as a suspect.

The investigation that followed quickly gave rise to substantial suspicious evidence.  First, the special agent investigating Ms. Harris’s murder noticed visible scratches on Mr. Harris’s hand and left forearm that could have been consistent with a struggle.  Further, several gray hairs that were collected from Ms. Harris’s left hand were believed to be her husband’s.  Mr. Harris’s DNA was also found in samples obtained from Ms. Harris’s rape kit.  Even more strangely, phone records reflected that Mr. Harris’s cellphone had been “inactive” from 1:32 p.m. to 2:19 p.m. on June 1, 2010—which was precisely the time period when Ms. Harris was believed to have been killed.  Moreover, it soon became clear that Mr. Harris had been having an extramarital affair with another woman at the time of Ms. Harris’s death.  In fact, it turned out that Mr. Harris had lied to Ms. Harris on the day that she was killed while simultaneously planning a tryst with his ex-wife that evening.  Significantly, Mr. Harris also failed to mention any of this in multiple written statements that he gave to police.

The death penalty trial that followed—and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s controversial 3-2 decision to affirm it—paints a vivid picture of America’s catastrophically broken system of capital punishment.  Continue reading In controversial 3-2 decision, Tennessee Supreme Court affirms death penalty conviction that is virtually certain to be overturned by a federal court. →

Tennessee Public Protection Act claims do not include a right to a jury trial, holds Tennessee Supreme Court.

Constitutional Law, Tennessee Constitutional Law, Tort Law, , ,

By Daniel A. Horwitz

After being accused of sexually harassing a city clerk, Mr. David Young – then the city administrator for the City of LaFollette – was fired by a majority vote of the LaFollette City Council.  Thereafter, Mr. Young sued the City in Circuit Court for retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Public Protection Act.[1]  In his complaint, Mr. Young requested a jury trial, which the City opposed.  Ultimately, the dispute over whether Mr. Young was entitled to a jury trial was appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court.  After considering several disparate constitutional and statutory provisions, the court concluded that Mr. Young had neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to have his case tried by a jury, and thus, his request for a trial by jury was denied.

Initially, the City argued that the Government Tort Liability Act (GTLA) expressly precluded a right to trial by jury.  The GTLA specifically states that claims brought under its provisions shall be tried “without the intervention of a jury.”[2]  According to the court, however, the Tennessee Public Protection Act is “an independent statute which establishes its own rights and remedies apart from the procedures that apply under the GTLA.”[3]  Thus, the GTLA’s prohibition against jury trials did not apply.

Separately, the Tennessee Constitution expressly includes a right to trial by jury.  Specifically, Tenn. Const. art. I, § 6 provides that “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate[.]”  Notwithstanding this apparent clarity, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held repeatedly that art. I, § 6 only provides a narrow right to trial by jury for claims that “existed at common law.”[4]  Incongruously, in practical terms, this means that the Tennessee Constitution only guarantees a right to trial by jury for claims that existed “under the laws and constitution of North Carolina at the time of the adoption of the Tennessee Constitution of 1796.”[5]  In this particular case, because the Tennessee Public Protection Act “was enacted by the Tennessee Legislature in 1990, almost two hundred years after the adoption of the first Tennessee Constitution,” the court explained that art. I, § 6 did not apply to Mr. Young’s retaliatory discharge claim, either.[6]

Continue reading Tennessee Public Protection Act claims do not include a right to a jury trial, holds Tennessee Supreme Court. →

Officials, Organizations, Community Activists Proclaim Support for Mass Expungement Effort

Expungement

Following last week’s historic filing of a proposed order – joined by District Attorney General Glenn Funk and Davidson County Criminal Court Clerk Howard Gentry – to expunge 350,000 dismissed case records involving 128,000 separate individuals, the following officials, organizations and community activists across Nashville have proclaimed their support for the effort.  Many more are expected to announce their support in the coming days and weeks.

Mayor-Elect Megan Barry:  “No individual should be unfairly penalized simply because they didn’t have the time, resources, or understanding of the law to have a charge expunged from their record.  I look forward to working with our criminal justice community to ensure this mass expungement program is implemented as efficiently and effectively as possible.”

State Senator Steve Dickerson (R-Nashville):  “Efforts like this help Tennesseans who want to buy a house, get a job or just get on with their lives. We all benefit when impediments to the American Dream are removed.”

State Representative Harold M. Love Jr. (D-Nashville):  “Our society gains a direct benefit when people are given a chance to improve their lives.  This is one such opportunity and I am glad to lend my support to the effort.”

Attorney David Raybin, Hollins, Raybin & Weissman, P.C.:  “Every week citizens call me to help with expungements because of the horrible effect some ancient arrest has on their life.  This Class action will help thousands of citizens.  I applaud the joint efforts of the court, the clerk’s office, the prosecutor and the private bar in making this a reality.”

 State Representative John Ray Clemmons (D-Nashville):  “Justice demands this momentous undertaking that will remove an undue stain on individuals’ records and help ensure their equal opportunity for employment.”

The Board of Directors of the Martha O’Bryan Center:  “The Martha O’Bryan Center joins in support of the recent class action suit which seeks to expedite without fees or charges the expungement process in Davidson County.  As an anti-poverty social services and education non-profit, we have seen many times when an arrest or charge, with no conviction, has prevented or compromised a citizen’s ability to gain employment.  This is a policy change that will positivity impact employability, housing availability, and improved HR practices in our city.”

A Voice for the Reduction of Poverty:  “We support the class action suit filed to automate and simplify  the expungement process in Davidson County.  We applaud and join in approval with Davidson County District Attorney, Glenn Funk and the Clerk of Courts, Howard Gentry, of this effort to make our county and court system more fair and equitable to all people regardless of economic status.”

District Attorney Glenn Funk:  “Consequences for criminal activity should be reserved for those who are guilty.”

Metro Council Member At-Large Erica Gilmore:  “​This will help put many Nashvillians back to work, add greatly to our economy and restore dignity to many who were hanging in the balance.  ​I wholeheartedly support this effort.”

Metro Council Member Fabian Bedne:  “When a system has such a huge number of people caught in the backlog, it’s time to re-examine the system.  People who have not yet had their records expunged can’t fully contribute to society.  Additionally, at a time when Nashville is enjoying unprecedented growth, we need to do what we can to maintain high levels of employment in order to lower costs and tame inflation.  This is the right thing to do from both a human and a business perspective.”

Metro Council Member Freddie O’Connell:  “This is a perfect example of a situation where what seems like a simple bureaucratic measure can have a lasting negative impact on the life of someone who has had an encounter with the justice system.  The impact of this simple effort should offer some additional procedural justice to a number of Nashvillians, and I’m glad to see it being supported by the administrators of our justice system.”

Jonathan Adair, Community & Civic Engagement Chair, Urban League Young Professionals of Middle Tennessee:  “Not only are so many unaware of expungement of dismissed criminal charges as a fundamental right, the inadvertent cost and time of the expungement process is an injustice to citizens everywhere.  For years, dismissed criminal charges and failed convictions have prevented individual progress while the criminal justice system blatantly neglects to acknowledge such a right.”

Judge Carol Soloman:  “Access to Justice is denied to an entire group of people when the process of getting a DISMISSED criminal charge removed from their record is so complicated and expensive that it’s out of their reach.”

Bettie Kirkland, Executive Director, Project Return:  “We at Project Return applaud the class action approach to expungements.  Every day, people are walking out of prison and returning to our community, and their successful reentry is important to all of us.  They face many challenges, as they strive, against the odds, to gain employment and housing.  Even though they’ve done their time and paid their debt to society, the records of their criminal history make this quest for a job and a place to live extremely difficult.  To chip away at these challenges by bringing Tennessee’s expungement law to bear is a benefit to them, and to all of us.  Every properly expungeable charge that can be taken off of a person’s record, the better off that person is as he or she strives to begin again.”

John Little III, Managing Partner, Strategy Redefined:  “This will truly help our justice system define that you are innocent until proven guilty.  This will help thousands of Nashvillians not have to face persecution in our job market, after wrongful prosecution.”

 Ashford Hughes, Nashville Organized for Action and Hope (NOAH): “The opportunity to achieve a second chance in our country is a fundamental value we all hold dear. This second chance will give these individuals an equal opportunity to further partake in the economic, social and family growth that we see happening throughout Nashville today.”

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